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Central banks react to movements in exchange rates probably in order to limit their effects on
inflation and on exports. The impact of import prices on inflation is small, however, according
to the analysis of the P-Star models for the United States and for Germany. Furthermore, there
is no clear-cut evidence that exchange rate volatility dampens exports. In an ECM-framework,
it is shown thai only in one of the five major European economies exports to the United Stales
are negatively influenced by a higher volatility. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the future
European Central Bank should follow a policy which is oriented at the exchange rate.
JEL Classification: E58, F17I. The Purpose of the Paper*
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the target of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to
achieve price level stability. In an open economy, changes in import prices may affect the
overall price level. It seems natural, therefore, for a centra! bank to be concerned with import
prices and exchange rates. Along this reasoning, a depreciation of the home currency would
cause the central bank to tighten its policy if it believes that otherwise inflationary expectations
would increase which might be difficult to check. This argument would lead to reactions of the
central bank even if exchange rates tend to return to their original level — or for that matter:
if purchasing power parity (PPP) holds — or even if increases in import prices have no
permanent effect on the price level. Another factor that may lead to a leaning against the wind
strategy of the central bank is the intention to limit the variability of exchange rates. Viewing
this as a measure of uncertainty many observers argue that "excessive" fluctuations tend to
reduce the level of international trade.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the empirical basis for these arguments is
strong enough to recommend that the ECB should be concerned with and react to exchange
rate changes. In Section II, we report reaction functions for the central banks of the G7-coun-
iries to check whether exchange rates have indeed mattered for monetary policy in the past.
The next section includes models for the inflationary process; here, it is intended to estimate
the short-term effects of import prices on inflation. The P-star model is used for the United
Stales, i.e. for a very large economy with a small international sector — the characteristics of
EMU as a whole — and second for Germany, i.e. the largest European economy which is very
open and where therefore a substantial impact of import prices on the overall price level may
be expected. In Section III, we test a standard single-equation model for the determination of
bilateral exports between the five largest European economies on the one hand and the United
States on the other. The variable of exchange rate volatility is included in the equations to test
the hypothesis that il affects exports negatively. Policy conclusions are summarized in the final
section.
Prepared for the CEPR Workshop "Options for the Future Exchange Rate Policy of the EMU"
(Pans. April 4/5, 1997).II. The Exchange Rate in the Reaction Function of Central
Banks
In order to demonstrate the importance of exchange rales for the behavior of central banks in
the G7-countries, we make use of the reaction functions estimated by Solvecn (1996). While
they arc derived there from a theoretical model a la Barro and Gordon (1983) in order to
analyze the importance of the independence of central banks, the purpose here is to analyze the
reaction of central banks to exchange rate changes. The characteristics of Ihe functions can be
summarized as follows:
1. The endogenous policy variable is Ihe day-to-day money market rate (r). While it may be
argued that central banks use other indicators such as the money stock for their actions
1, Ihe
• reasoning here is that all central banks more or less focus on determining the short-term
interest tale when deciding upon the course of their policy. . .
2. The factors determining monetary policy are those commonly stated by the central banks
themselves. Apart from the exchange rate we use indicators related to the business cycle
and inflation: Cyclical movements are measured in terms of capacity utilization cu (actual
real GDP relative to potential output); inflation jt is defined as the annual rate of increase in
the deflator for private consumption.
2
The choice of the exchange rate measure needs explaining. For the European countries —
except for Germany — the appropriate measure seems to be the nominal effective exchange
rate; these countries can be assumed to be concerned with the exchange rates vis-a-vis the
currencies of their main trading partner countries. For Germany, the most relevant foreign
1 The most obvious candidate would be the Deutsche Bundesbank. But also the German central bank
manipulates the repo rate and does not pursue a policy of directly controlling the monetary base
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1995). Furthermore, the target variable M3 is not significant in the reaction
function for the money market rate (Solvecn 1996: 53ff.).
2 We use the OECD-estimates for potential output. The deflator is used instead of the CPI because of
the peculiarity of the index in the United Kingdom.currency is the US dollar according to the slatcments of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
3 The dollar
is also the obvious choice for Canada and for Japan because of their large share of exports to
the US. For the US we try two measures, i.e. the yen and the nominal effective exchange rate.
The reaction functions
4 are estimated in the common error-correction framework. For all
seven countries, the equation to begin with is of the following type-
5:
A r: = c- a • /•,_, + <x, • jt, , + «, • (.«,_, + u, • el_1
After estimating all lagged coefficients in the first model, we follow the method ("general to
specific") described by Gilbert (19S6) and eliminate the coefficient with the lowest t-value until
the final prediction error (FPE) of the equations reaches the minimum, i.e. until the "best"
model in terms of the FPE is found. Tests for cointegration arc based on Kremers et al. (1992).
In equation [1], the null-hypothesis of no cointegration is equivalent to stating that Ho: a = 0.
The results for the final model are reported in the appendix (Table Al).
The importance of the variables under consideration can be demonstrated with the help of
shock simulations. Here, we concentrate on the reaction of the central banks to the exchange
rate: How docs the path of the short-term interest rate change in response to a permanent one-
percent devaluation of the respective currency? Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the adjust-
ment. Note that the United States is left out here because the exchange rate was not significant
in the reaction function (Table Al), a fact that supports the notion of "benign neglect" on the
side of the Fed.
Movements of the priee of European currencies should not matter for the Bundesbank because of
the anchor function of the D-mark in the EMS. Instead, the other countries would probably react to
stabilize the exchange rale.
Tests for unit roots are not reported because the main purpose here is to demonstrate the importance
of a particular variable. Sec Solveen (iyy6) for detailed test statistics.
Except for the interest rate, all variables are in logs. Quarterly data are used.Figure 1: Response of the Short-term Interest Rate to a
One Percent Devaluation of the Home Currency
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QuartersThe response is quite different for the six countries with respect to the size and the pattern.
The strongest lightening after a devaluation takes place in Canada and in France (more than 30
and 20 basis points, respectively), while the smallest increase in the short-term interest rate is
calculated for Germany and for Japan (less than 10 basis points). It has to be noted that these
responses arc only partial, i.e. they do not reflect the whole system at work since only one
equation was estimated for each country.
6 Therefore, not too much emphasis should be put on
the pattern in the medium term. Nevertheless, it can be said that there is a significant impact of
exchange rale movements on monetary policy in six of the G7-countries.
III. Import Prices and Inflation
Inflation rates may be affected by changes in import prices, whether these come about by
changes in raw material prices and other goods or primarily by movements in the exchange
rate. How much import prices matter for current inflation can only be tested in a complete
model. The framework chosen here is the P-star approach developed by Hallman, Porter and
Small (1991) which was later applied to Germany by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
7 The P-star
model is derived from the quantity theory of money. It states that the equilibrium price level
(I'*) is determined solely by the money stock. The model allows for a dynamic adjustment of
the actual price level (P) to the equilibrium path; the difference between P* and P is called the
price gap which drives Ihc adjustment of inflation: If this gap is positive, inflation will increase
and vice versa. The price gap can be derived in various ways.
8 Here, we follow Todter and
Reimers (1994) who estimate the price gap directly in the money demand function.
6 Vector autoregressions would be more appropriate if the response of the whole system were to be
analyzed. For example, an increase in the interest rate might lead to a higher output gap which
would lead to a reduction in the interest rate and so on.
7 For an extensive version cf. Todter and Reimers (1994). In this paper, we largely follow Kramer
and Scheide (1994).
8 By definition, the price gap is equal to the sum of the output gap and the velocity gap. Several
researchers choose to estimate the equilibrium values of output and velocity to calculate the gaps
by, for example, defending or using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.6
The quantity equation (all variables in logs) can be written as
[2] in - p = y - v or
where the variables are the money stock m, the price level p, output y and velocity v; the
asterisks refer to the respective equilibrium values. The equation of the demand for real
balances
|31 m-p = |3, + |32y + w
is combined with |2J:
Since equilibrium velocity is
[4'] v* = -|3,+(l-p\)y*
we can derive the equilibrium price level p* by combining [2'] with [4']:
[5] p* = ifi-p,-p,y'
Subtracting p from both sides and solving for the real money stock, we get (now using an
index for lime)
[6] m, - p,= (3, + P2y" + e, with e, = p, - p,
This long-run money demand lunction is estimated for the United States and for Germany.
9
The residuals of these regressions form the price gap which enters the equation for inflation:
9 To account for instabilities in the respective money demand functions, dummies were added: For the
United States, a dummy for the intercept and the slope was used for the period after 1990 because,
obviously, the parameters of the demand function changed in the early 1990s; for Germany, a
dummy was used for the intercept only to account for the effects of German unification (from
1990:3 onwards).[7]
? > 5 •
• V a,.,- K~_:, + V Y (• A/p,_. + \ h. • &ulcl_i + |J, • pgap,_L + u, .
In this regression, we do not only use monetary factors (i.e. the price gap) as in Hallman,
Porter and Small, but also cost factors which affect the short-run dynamics, i.e. import prices
and unit labor costs.
1
0 The estimation period is 1975-1996. The unit root tests for all variables
under consideration are reported in Table A2. Since all the series are 1(1) — except for, of
course, the price gap which is 1(0) —, fourth differences are used in the estimation.
1
1 The
results arc summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. The test-statistics show that there are no mis-
specifications in the equations.
1
2 The coefficients show the expected positive signs. The quality
of the regression can be demonstrated in a dynamic simulation (Figure 2).
As we are interested in the effect of import prices on inflation, we run shock simulations:
Each of the right hand side variables is raised by one percent for one year. Figure 3 shows that
a one percent increase in import prices raises the inflation rate by one or two tenths of a
percentage point in both countries. This effect naturally dissipates after a few quarters just as
the effect stemming from higher unit labor costs. In contrast, the effect of one percent increase
in the money slock builds up slowly and is more persistent.
The results show that the impact of import prices on inflation is significantly positive in the
short run; however, it is not very large. Also, the openness of the two economies does not play
a role because the effect is more or less the same. In general, import price inflation was not
very important in the past 15 years in both countries in spite of substantial changes in exchange
rates
13: It was roughly stationary around zero, and the rates of change rarely exceeded
1
0 See Todter and Reimers (1994) and Kramer and Scheide (1994) for a discussion.
1
1 Quarterly data are used, for pragmatic reasons, i.e. to smooth the series of inflation, we use year-
over-year changes rather than quarter-over-quartcr changes of the variables.
1
2 In the regressions, a few dummies have to be used for outliers; some of the sudden changes in infla-
tion are, for example, due to tax increases so that they cannot be explained by this model.
1
3 Of course, import prices increased a lot faster in the wake of the oil price shocks in the 1970s.Table 1 — Test Results for the Final Models" — P-Star
R
2
Adjusted R
2
Tests for autocorrelation
ILM-tcst 1st order (x
2 - distributed)
LM-test 4lh order (/
2 - distributed)
Tests for heteroskedasticity
ARCH-test (x
2 - distributed)
LR-test (x
2 - distributed)
Test for structural breaks
Chow-test (mid-ofrsample, F-distribuled)
Test for the normality of residuals
Jarque-Hera-test ( x
2 - distributed)
FPE(xlO
5)
"Significance levels in brackets.
United States
0.99
0.99
1.63
(0.20)
3.04
(0.55)
1.13
(0.29)
-5.72
(1.00)
0.56
(0.91)
1.63
(0.44)
1.24
Germany
0.9S
0.97
0.06
(0.80)
3.08
(0.54)
0.93
(0.34)
3.60
(0.06)
1.18
(0.32)
1.18
(0.55)
0.96Table 2 — Estimated Coefficients of the P-Star-Models"
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# dummies
"(-statistics in brackets.
United Slates
1975:1-1996:4
0.01
(1.50)
0.04
(3.84)
1.05
(22.91)
_
-0.36
(-4.09)
0.22
(2.97)
0.16
(9.16)
-0.15
(-7.50)
0.07
(3.14)
-0.04
(-2.50)
—
-0.08
(-2.28)
0.22
(4.55)
-0.10
(-2.70)
—
—
6
Germany
1975:1-1996:4
0.01
(5.24)
0.07
(3.87)
0.60
(8.65)
-0.12
(-1.78)
—
0.14
(3.32)
0.10
(7.38)
-0.03
(-1.92)
0.03
(2.63)
—
—
0.07
(1.87)
-0.11
(-2.01)
0.13
(3.09)
—
0.04
(1.85)
—
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Figure 2: Dynamic Simulation of the Inflation Rate in the United States and
in Germany on the Basis of the Estimated P-Star Models
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Figure 3: Response of the Inflation Rate in the United States and in Germany to
a One Percent Rise in the Monetary Aggregate, the Import Prices and the Unit
Labor Costs
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5 percent. In addition, only part of such increases was due to depreciations of the home
currency. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that a depreciation should lead the central bank
to tighten its policy. One can be skeptical with regard to such a policy advice for two reasons:
First, we do not know whether monetary policy can indeed manipulate the exchange rate in the
desired way, and second, a monetary tightening would have a dampening effect on inflation
only with a lag; as our results show, the effects of changes in the money stock become
substantial only after the effect of import prices on inflation has peaked.
IV. Exports and the Volatility of the Exchange Rate
According to practically all economic theories, the real exchange rate has an impact on the
volume of trade. If a currency devalues, it may be that foreign exporters accept some reduction
of their profit margins in order to limit the loss of market shares; nevertheless, exports to the
respective country will be reduced. The effect of central bank actions on the real exchange rate
is limited to the short run. In the long run, the real exchange rate is solely determined by real
factors. This means that a central bank can influence the real rate and thus the competitiveness
of exporters only — if at all — in the short run.
Apart from the impact of the level of the exchange rate, it may be that its volatility matters
for trade. A common argument is that the central bank should react to movements in exchange
rate in order to reduce the volatility which has, according to a number of theories, a negative
effect on exports. We test this proposition by looking at the determinants of exports of the five
major EU-countries.
1
4 The United States is the country which has the biggest share in total
EU-exports.
1
5 Therefore, we analyze the behavior of exports to the US.
1
4 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
1
5 In 1994, the last year for which data.are available, exports to the United Slates amounted to around
20 percent of total EU-exports (OECD 1997a). Looking at the United States does also make sense
because deviations from PPP have been much larger for the dollar than for European exchange
rates.1
3 sfb§ insfirufs fiu We
!iv/ir;sc
1. How Does the Volatility of the Exchange Rate Affect Trade between Two
Countries?
For a long time, there was unanimity between economists that an increasing volatility of the
exchange rates results in reduced international trade.'
6 The explanation rests on the assumption
that firms are risk averse: An increasing in volatility raises the uncertainty concerning profits,
and firms will concentrate more on the domestic market where the margins are not influenced
by changes in the exchange rate, at least not to the same extent as on the foreign market. In
contrast to this reasoning, de Grauwe (1988) shows that more restrictive assumptions with
respect to the utility function of the firms than simply risk aversion are necessary to come to
such a clear-cut conclusion. Using a simple model, he demonstrates that the direction of the
influence of exchange rate volatility on the volume of exports depends on the convexity
properties of the utility function. If the respective firm is very risk averse, a rise in the volatility
of exchange rates still results in a decrease of expected total utility; however, it is possible that
the expected marginal utility of selling abroad increases so that the firm will expand its export
activities. In general, therefore, the correlation between the volatility of exchange rates and
exports may be either positive or negative. This explains why empirical tests have come up
with conflicting results.'
7 Another reason for this may be that the possibilities for firms to
insure themselves against losses related to exchange rate changes have improved significantly
in recent years, thus reducing the risk of export activity.
2. Measuring Exchange Rate Volatility
In our tests, we calculate the standard deviation of the monthly changes in the nominal ex-
change rate of the dollar vis-a-vis the respective currencies over the past twelve months. This
is the measure of exchange rate volatility which is also the basis in many empirical studies on
this topic. The resulting series for the five largest EU-countries are shown in Figure 4, The use
1
6 See, for example, the paper by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978).
1
7 Cf. the survey by Cote (1994). She also discusses other reasons why uncertainty about exchange
rates may result in an increase of exports. Furthermore, the effects on export prices depend crucially
on the assumptions of the underlying model.14
Figure 4: Variability of the $-Exchange Rate
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of the nominal instead.of the real exchange rate can be justified because costs of production arc
given in the short run. Nevertheless, there are only minor differences between the volatility of
the nominal and the real exchange rate if the standard deviation is used.
Recently, ARCH-, GARCH- and related models were often used to calculate a measure for
uncertainty of exchange rates (for example, Holly 1995). In such models, uncertainty increases
with the forecast error of individuals. There are several reasons why we do not use this
approach. The most important one is that the purpose of this paper is to give advice to policy-
makers. For practical purposes, therefore, it is preferable to use a measure which can be easily
observed. Otherwise, monetary policy would have to be based on the results of an econometric
model which very much depend on its specification.
3. The Empirical Model
We estimate a model with the standard assumptions concerning the determinants of exports.
1
8
The explanatory variables are the real exchange rate e between the US dollar and the home,
currency of the respective European country and an indicator of economic activity in the
United States which is approximated by the index of industrial production y.
Possible constraints on the supply side in the exporting country
 l
9 are captured by the rate of
capacity utilization cu. This is defined as the ratio between actual industrial production and its
trend, which is calculated with a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Finally, exchange rate volatility a is
added to the equation.
For all series, logarithms of quarterly data are used. The estimation period is 1980 to 1996.
For France, data for exports to the United States are available only from 1982 onwards so that,
in this case, we start with the first quarter of 1984. The results of the unit root tests are
1
8 A problem with bilateral trade is that the respective price indices are not available. We therefore use
the price index for total exports of the respective country for deflating the nominal values of exports
to the US.
l
s Compare the discussion in Dopke. Fischer (1994).16
reported in Table A2 in the appendix.
2
0 The degree of integration of the various scries is
usually as expected. As an exception, French real exports appear to be 1(0). However, we
handle this series as if it was integrated in order to be able to compare the results. With respect
to exchange rate volatility, the results are mixed. In two cases, the series seem lo be integrated
of order one, in three cases they seem to be stationary. According to the hypothesis to be
tested, exchange rate volatility has a long lasting influence on the level of trade and not only a
temporary one on its growth rate. Therefore, we follow the reasoning by Hansen (1993: 150)
and include this variable in the ECM-framcwork.
2
1
The following equation is estimated:
4 4 4
AJT, = c + u • jr,_j + [3 • eM + yy, , + 8 • u,_, + V a,. • Ax, . + \ (3. • Ac-
1, ,. + \ y,. • Ay, ,
[8] *
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1 ' J 4
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4. The Results
We again apply the general-to-specific method and eliminate step by step the coefficients with
the lowest l-statistic until the FPE of the equation reaches its minimum. After each elimination,
we test whether the assumptions of the OLS-mcthod (normality of residuals, homoskedasticity,
structural stability of the model and no autocorrelation) are fulfilled. The test results for the
final models are shown in Table 3.
The coefficients of the final models are presented in Table 4. The (-statistic of the coefficient
a indicates whether there is a cointegrating relationship between the time series of real
exports, the real exchange rate, industrial production abroad and exchange rate variability.
2
0 For. US industrial production, real exports and the real exchange rate a constant and a time trend is
included for the tests of stationarity of the levels of these time series. In all other cases, only a
constant is included.
2
1 A similar approach is used by Arize (1995).17
Table 3 — Test Results, for the Final Models"— Export Functions
Adjusted R
2
Tests {or autocorrelation
LM-lcst 1 si order
(X"" distributed)
LM-tcsl 4lh order
(X^ - distributed)
Tests for heteroskedasticity
ARCH-lest
(X~" distributed)
LR-tcsl
(X
2 - distributed)
Test for structural breaks
Chow-lest (mid-of-sample,
l-'-distributcdj
Test for the normality of
residuals
Jarque-Bera-tesl
(X
2- distributed)
I
:PE (xlO
1)
'Significance levels in brackets.
France
0.83
0.76
0.49
(0.48)
9.47
(0.06)
0.02
(0.90)
-13.92
(1.00)
0.45
(0.94)
0.16
(0.92)
1.71
Germany
0.82
0.77
0.91
(0.34)
2.37
(0.67)
0.36
(0.55)
-2.73
(1.00)
0.86
(0.61)
0.57
(0.75)
2.01
Italy
0.75
0.69
2.03
(0.15)
1.84
(0.76)
0.26
(0.61)
3.07
(0.08)
0.99
(0.49)
0.01
'•:.. (0.99)
2.67
Spain
0.84
0.78
0.90
(0.34)
7.03
(0.13)
3.45
(0.06)
-2.40
(1.00)
0.90
(0.58)
2.00
(0.37)
5.43
United
Kingdom
0.85
0.80
1.33
(0.Z5)
8.11
(0.09)
0.08
(0.78)
-5.84
(1.00)
0.74
(0.74)
1.77
(0.41)
1.8518
Table 4 — Estimated Coefficients of the Export Functions"
Period
constant
*.-S
A*,_,
A*,-2
A*,.,
A*,_<
Ae,
A^,
Aft.2
Aft,,
A<2,^ • ; ; •
Ay,
Ay,-,
France
1984:1-1996:4
0,10
(0.28)
-0.25
(-3,05")
—
0.15
(1.34)
—
-0.38
(-3.87)
0.23
(2.51)
0.24
(2.73)
—
-0.49
(-3.85)
-0.46
(-3.13)
—
-0.32
(-2.36)
0.39
(3.00)
—
—
Germany
1980:1-1996:4
-1.97
(-4.14)
-0.34
(-5.07*")
-0.42
(-5.41)
0.66
(4.63)
0.02
(1.56)
-0.20
(-2.98)
—
-0.16
(-2.55)
—
-0.45
(-4.02)
—
0.20
(1.64)
—
0.25
(2.07)
1.43
(3.30)
—
Italy
1980:1-1996:4
-0.01
(-1.27)
—
—
—
—
-0.23
(-2.53)
—
—
—
-0.18
(-1.57)
-0.21
(-1.67)
-0.63
(-4.81)
—
—
2.65
(4.80)
—
Spain
1980:1- 1996:4
-3.30
(-3.17)
-0.32
(-3.55*)
-0.35
(-3.51)
0.80
(3.47)
-0.02
(-0.64)
-0.33
(-4.34)
—
—
—
-0.43
(-2.13)
0.67
(3.21)
-0.39
(-1.86)
—
5.56
(6.72)
United
Kingdom
1980:1-1996:4
-0.89.
(-2.43)
-0.38
(-4.58***)
-0.25
(-3.08)
0.49
(3.51)
0.01
(1.52)
-0.19
(-2.61)
-0.10
(-1.55)
—
-0.27
(-4.28)
-0.49
(-4.65)
—
-~
—
-0.14
(-1.59)
—
0.95
(2.37)Table 4 — continued
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Ay,_2
A}', i
Ay, 4
cu,
Cll
C",-2
cu
ACT,
A<J
Aa
Aa,_,
AIT
# dummies
"(-statistics in br
France
—
-1.29
(-2.02)
—
—
—
-0.67
(-2.00)
—
-0.03
(-1.94)
0.04
(3.00)
-0.02
(-1.33)
1
Germany Italy
1.05 2.83
(2.50) (5.55)
— —
0.98 0.73
(2.24) (-1.45)
—
 :-1.17
(-3.28)
— 0.87
(2.28)
— —
— 0.58
(2.09)
0.02
(1.53)
— -0.0G
(-3.01)
— 0.07
(4.10)
— —
1 2
Spain
-3.12
(-3.03)
2.75
(3.22)
-3.18
(-3.98)
—
-1.57
(-3.06)
1.39
(2.74)
—
—
3
United
Kingdom
—
-0.87
(-1.89)
0.78
(1.56)
—
—
-0.41
(-1.69)
—
—
—
—
4
rckets. —
b The t-vaiue for this coefficient is the basis for the lest of cointegration. The
null-hypothesis of no cointegralioil is rejected at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level (•**, *
lively. Fur the critical values, cf. Banerjec el ai. (1992).
* and *), respec-20
Only for Italy, the hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. For France, there seems
to be a long-run relationship only between real exports and US industrial production. This
means that in the long run the real exchange rate and the exchange rate volatility do not matter
for the level of real exports. Figure 5 shows the results of the dynamic simulation of exports
using the estimated models.
In general, the coefficients have the expected sign. With respect to exchange rate volatility,
the results are mixed. For three countries, this series is included in the long-run relationship.
For Spain, the coefficient has a negative sign, whereas the effect is positive for Germany and
for the United Kingdom. But the values of the coefficients arc rather small: An increase in the
volatility by 10 percentage points changes the volume of exports by at most 0.6 percent. In
order to demonstrate the short-run dynamics, we run shock simulations in which the volatility
of exchange rates is increased permanently by one percentage point. Figure 6 shows that there
is a small impact of the volatility on exports in France and in Italy which lasts only about one
year. For the other three countries, the changes in exports have roughly the same magnitude
but, as mentioned before, the effect works in different directions.
These results are in line with other findings which show no clear-cut evidence concerning the
direction of the influence of exchange rate volatility on the volume of exports. Furthermore,
the coefficients in the long-run relationship arc rather small. Consequently, it seems very
questionable whether monetary policy should try to smooth movements of the dollar exchange
V. Policy Conclusions
The question whether the European Central Bank should react to exchange rate movements is
twofold: Is it desirable and is it feasible? If exchange rate changes are drastic and if they lead to
substantial fluctuations of import prices, the target for the inflation rate may not be achieved in
the short run. However, empirical estimates such as presented in this paper show that these
effects are not large. The issue of exchange rate volatility has been discussed in the literature
for a long time. The results presented in Section IV are another example of the ambiguity with21
Figure 5: Dynamic Simulation of the Exports to the United States
on the Basis of the Estimated Models
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Figure 6: Response of the Exports to the United States
to a One Percent Rise in Exchange Rate Variability
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respect to the hypothesis of a negative impact on international trade. In general, they do not
lend support to a policy of exchange rate orientation.
Even if exchange rate movements raise uncertainty for exporters and investors, it must still
be asked whether the reaction of central banks would reduce it. The causes of exchange rate
fluctuations are often jusl not known, so a change in the domestic interest rate may not have
the desired effect. There are numerous examples when interest rate changes did not have the
predicted effect on the exchange rate in the past. If the trend of the real exchange rate turns
into another direction because of real changes in the respective economies at work, can the
central bank really know how to prevent this? As an example: At which level of the short-term
interest rate in Germany would the appreciation of the US dollar in the early 1980s have
stopped at a rate of DM 2.00 instead of going up to DM 3.40?
If the aim of the central bank is to smooth the movement of the exchange rate, there is the
additional problem of time lags between the observation and the policy action ("recognition
lag") and between the policy action and the response of the exchange rate ("transition lag").
These lags are certainly much shorter than, for example, those of the effect of monetary policy
on the inflation rate; but if exchange rate volatility is to be reduced, they would have to
disappear completely. Otherwise, the policy actions may raise volatility. Furthermore, even if
such a policy is successful, it has to be taken into account that the consequence must be a
greater volatility in interest rates. This would have a negative impact on investment which may
be larger than the total effect of exchange rate volatility on exports and on investment.
2
2
Another — and perhaps a more important — problem in this context is, how the central
bank can discriminate between a movement of the exchange rate around a known trend and
the beginning of a new trend. Only in the first case monetary policy might try to do something
to react to reduce the volatility; but it can still be asked why a reaction is necessary at all if Ihe
trend is known. In the second case, however, there is no reason for monetary policy to react
because the change is caused by a shift in the fundamentals.
For an analysis of the effects of uncertainty on investment cf. Seppelfricke (1996).24 .
These arguments are not new in the discussion on exchange rate regimes. Maybe the
European Central Bank fares better in its policy if influential people.get rid of the illusion that
a weak currency creates jobs whereas a strong currency is bad for the economy. The present
discussion on EMU shows that this philosophy is still alive.25
Appendix A:
Table Al — Estimates of Reaction Function [1]"
I
Period
United
States
1983-95
Japan
1980-95
Canada
1982-95
Germany
1980-95
France
1980-95
United
Kingdom
1980-95 1980-95
constant
Ar.
Are.
A7t,
-0.01 -3.63
(-0.24) (-2.82)
1.27
(2.57)
1.06
(4.91)
25.83
(5.32)
0.48
(5.20)
--O.32 -0.32 -0.22 -0.24
(-5.32***) (-5.02***) (-5.89***) (-6.20***)
0.10
(1.52)
0.10
(2.80)
0.01
(3.43)
0.34
(5.15)
0.35
(4.52)
0.21
(5.41)
0.02
(1.33)
0.28
(4-21)
0.07
(1.42)
0.09
(1.91)
0.17
(5.94)
0.01
(1.30)
0.13
(1.57)
0.17
(2.24)
0.12
(3.84)
0.12
(3.52)
-0.05
(-5.01)
-0.30
(-2.49)
-0.26
(-3.12)
2.58
(4.94)
-0.42
(-6.18***)
0.23
(3.42)
0.37
(6.65)
0.12
(1.54)
-0.13
(-1.84)
0.19
(1.62)
28.61
(4.52)
-0.30
(-5.12***)
0.39
(8.91)
0.38
(5.88)
-0.06
-0.11
(-1.35)
-0.27
(-3.51)
0.10
(1.59)
0.39
(3.88)
-0.16
(-1.41)
0.12
(1.78)
0.13
(1.52)
0.20
(3.88)
—
0.17
(1.98)
—
0.20
(3.67)
0.51
(4.74)
—
—
-0.32
(-1.62)
-0.26
(-1.98)
—
0.56
(3.62)
-0:41
(-2.71)
-0.55
(-3.97)26
Table Al -
A7t,_4
A™,
A™, ,
Ac;/,,,
ACLI, -
Ae,
A<?,_,
Ae, ,
Ae,_,
Ae, 4
# dummies
- continued
United
Stales
—
0.16
(2-04)
0.43
(4.68)
-0.19
(-1-96)
0.10
(1.38)
—
—
1
Japan
-0.22
(-2.47)
0.31
(4.32)
0.18
(2.47)
0.13
(1.71)
-0.10
(-1.37)
—
0.02
(2.13)
0.01
(1.24)
0.01
(1.51)
s
Canada
—
0.30
(2.66)
0.52
(4.69)
-0.60
(-4.87)
0.28
(2.43)
—
0.35
(7.24)
—
-0.20
(3.70)
7
Germany
—
0.10
(2.70)
—
—
—
—
0.03
(3.64)
-0.02
(-1.87)
0.03
(3.55)
3
France
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
-0.06
(-1.59)
—
5
United
Kingdom
-0.34
(-2.25)
0.26
(1.26)
-0.83
(3.25)
—
—
—
-0.10
(-3.21)
-0.05
(-1.30)
-0.06
(-2.00)
5
Italy
—
0.46
(3.51)
—
—
—
—
-0.07
(-1.97)
—
0.09
(2.26)
—
0.07
(1.94)
4
"t-statistics in brackets. — 'The t-value for this coefficient is ihe basis for the test of cointegralion. The
null-hypothesis of no cointegralion is rejected at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level (***, ** and *), respec-
tively. For the critical values, cf. Banerjee et al. (1992).27
Table A2 — Unit Root Tests" for the Time Series Used in the P-Star Models
Variable" DF ADF] ADF2 ADF3. | ADF4 Result
P
n = Ap
Aip
uk
Auk
pgap'
P
K = Ap
Aip
uk
Auk
-1.54
-2.47
-0.68
-5.42***
0.91
-2.84*
-4.30***
United States
-1.04
-2.49
-1.20
-5.14***
-0.80
-3.13**
-3.00***
-0.96
-2.95**
-1.25
-4.87***
-0.71
-3.13**
--2.94***
-0.68
-2.06
-1.29
-3.53***
-0.64
-2.16
-2.73***
Germany
1(1)
Id)
KD
1(0)
-0.08
-1.99
-0.04
-4.60***
0.09
-2.51
-0.84
-0.32
-2.13
0.94
-3.80***
0.91
-2.93**
-1.79
"Dickey-Fuller test and augmented Dickey-Fuller t-test. Regressions include a constant and for levels a
linear time trend. ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 %
significance level, respectively, based on the critical values of McKinnon (1990). —
 bLogs of the
respective variables: A = first difference. —
 cln the test specifications for pgap neither a constant nor a
lime trend is included.
-2.12
-2.44
-0.79
^.65***
-1.74
-4.09***
-4.67***
-1.67
-2.57*
-0.60
-4.84***
-1.92
-3.42**
-3.02***
-1.55
-2.68*
-0.56
_4.47***
-2.00
-3.85***
-2.55**
-1.45
-2.41
-0.55
-3.12**
-1.52
-347**
-2.14**
Id)
1(1)
1(1)
1(0)28
Table A3 — Unit Root Tests" for the Time Series Used in the Export Models
Variable"
e
Ae
X
cu
a
Aa
e
Ae
.V
A.Y
cu
a
e
Ae
X
Ax
cu
a
DF
-1.49
-5 22***
-3.85**
-2.19
-2.76*
-5.84***
-1.31
-6.56***
-2.20
-12.57***
-2.70*
-3.73***
-1.50
-6.44***
-1.92
-8.84***
-3.31**
-2.33
ADF1
-2.16
-4.41**
-3.02
-2.01
-3.58***
-6.95***
-1.78
-5.34***
-1.75
-6.28***
-2.95**
-5.91***
-2.11
-5.75***
-1.95
-5.22***
-3.74***
-3.21**
ADF2 j ADF3
France
-2.13 -2.52
_3.45*« -3.35**
-3.51** -4.11**
-2.62* -2.79*
-2.48 -2.50
_4.99*** -4.4|***
Germany
-1.76 -2.13
-3.81*** -3.37**
-1.89 -1.85
-5.18*** -4.56***
-3.09** -3.66***
-3.71*** -3.20**
Italy
-1.93 -2.38
-4.00*** -3.61***
-2.36 -2.79
—3.91*** -3.95***
-3.38** -3.12**
-2.48 -3.48**
ADK4
-2.38
-3.53**
-3.59**
-2.65*
-2.35
-4.66***
-2.24
-3.46**
-1.79
-3.13**
-3.49**
-3.39**
-2.48
-3.65***
-2.60
-^.51***
-3.59***
-4.00***
Result
1(1)
1(0)
1(0)
I(D
I(D
1(1)
1(0)
1(0)
Id)
1(1)
1(0)
1(0)29
Table A3 — continued
Variable"
Ae
A.v
cu
a
ACT
Ae
x
Ax
cu
a
Av
DF ADF1
-1.72
_5.43***
ADF4
Spain
-1.22
-6.31***
-2.73
-13,00***
-3.63***
-2.77*
-7.59***
-2.00
-7.36***
-2.82
-12.14***
-2.47
-2.84*
-1.73
^.65***
-1.89
-5,91***
-2.68*
-3.42**
-9.20***
-2.36
-5.90***
-2.11
-8.48***
-3.38**
_442***
-1.94
-3.72***
-2.38
-4.87***
-3.26**
-2.10
-6.30***
United K,
-2.30
_490***
-1.80
-6.14***
-3.24**
-2.50
-2.17
_373***
-2.45
-5.25***
-4.31***
-2.30
_549***
ingdom
-2.36
-4.22***
-1.80
-6.97***
-3.20**
-2.71*
-2.02
-3.26**
-2.01
_4.29**'*
-3.86***
-2.36
-4.87***
-2.46
-4.55***
-1.36
-4.79***
-3.02**
-2.95**
Industrial Production in the United Stales
-2.91 -2.83 -3.37* -2.96
* -3.84*** -4.22*** -4.06***
Result
KD
1(1)
1(0)
KD
KD
1(0
1(0)
1(0)
1(1)
'Dickey-Fuller test and augmented Dickey-Fuller West. Regressions include a constant and (for levels of
e, x and y) a linear time trend. ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1 %,
5 % and 10 % significance level, respectively, based on the critical values of McKinnon (1990). —
bLogs of the respective variables: A = first difference.30
Appendix B:
Data Sources and Methods of Calculation
1. Time Series for the P-Star-Models
Prices (p): Germany: Deflator of private consumption (Statistisches
Bundesamt).
United States: CPI (OECD).
Real monetary aggregates (m): Germany: M3. Deutsche Bundesbank.
United States: M2 (OECD). Deflated by the deflator of
private consumption (Germany) and the CPI (United
Slates), respectively.
Import prices (ip): Germany: Deflator of imports (Statistisches Bundesamt).
United States: Import prices (Department of Commerce).
Unit labor costs (ulc): Germany: Total economy (Statistisches Bundesamt).
United States: Business sector (Department of Labor).
2. Time Series for the Export Models
Real exports (x):
US industrial production (y):
Nominal exports to the United States. France (INSEE),
Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank). Italy (Istituto
Nazionale di Statistica), Spain (OECD) and United
Kingdom (Office of National Statistics). Deflated by
export prices (same sources).
OECD.31
Real exchange rate (e): Nominal exchange rates vis-a-vis the US-dollar (IMF). •
Real exchange rates calculated by using the consumer
price index in the United States and in the respective
country:
\nat. curr. I I nut. curr. I CPI US
e\ = ne\ - [ $ J CPI European Country
with ne = nominal exchange rate.
Domestic capacity utilization (cu): Normal capacity utilization in manufacturing is calculated
by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (X = 1600). Industrial
production (OECD).
Exchange rate volatility (o ): Standard deviation of monthly changes in the nominal
exchange rate vis-a-vis the US dollar over the past twelve
months. Nominal exchange rates (IMF).32
Bibliography
Arize, A.C. (1995). Trade Flows and Real Exchange-Rate Volatility: An Application of
Cointegration and Error-Correction Modeling. The North American Journal of
Economics and Finance, 6(1): 37—51.
Banerjee, A., J.J. Dolado and R. Mestre (1992). On Some Simple Tests for Coinlcgration: The
Cost of Simplicity. Discussion Paper of the Institute of Economics at Aarhus University.
Barro, R.J., and D.B. Gordon (1983). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of
Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101-121.
Cote. A. (1994). Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade — A Suivev. Working Paper 94-5. Bank
of Canada. Ottawa.
Dopke, J., and M. Fischer (1994). Was bestimmt die westdeutschen Exporte? Die
Weltwirtschaft: 54-66.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). Die Ccldpolilik der Bundesbank. Frankfurt am Main.
Gilbert, C.L. (1986). Professor Hendry's Econometric Methodology. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 48: 283- 307.
Hallman, J.J., R.D. Porter and D.H. Small (1991). Is the Price Level Tied to the M2 Monetary
Aggregate in the Long Run? The American Economic Review, 81: 841- 858.
Holly, S. (1995). Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Export Performance: Supply and Demand
Effects. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 24: 381 -391.
Hooper, P., and S.W. Kohlhagen (1978). The Effect of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on the
Prices and Volume of International Trade. Journal of International Economics, 8: 483-
511.
IMF (1997). International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.33
Kramer. J., and J. Scheide (1994). Geldpolitik: Zuriick zur Potentialorientierung. Kiel
Discussion Papers 235. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.
Kremers, J.J.M., N.R. Ericsson and J.J. Dolado (1992). The Power of Cointegration Tests.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54: 325- 348.
Lapp, S., J. Scheide and R. Solveen (1995). Determinants of Exports in the G7-Countries.
. Kieler Working Papers 707. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.
McKinnon, J.G. (1990). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests. UCSD Economics Discussion
Paper: 90- 94.
OECD (1997a). Foreign Trade Statistics. Paris.
— (1997b). Main Economic Indicators. Paris.
Seppelfricke, P. (1996). Investitionen unler Unsicherheit. Schriften zur angewandten Okono-
melrie 31. Frankfurt am Main.
Solveen, R. (1996). Verhindert die Unabhangigkeit der Zentralbank politische Konjunktur-
zyklen? Kiel Working Papers 747. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.
Todter, K.-H., and H.-E. Reimers (1994). P-Star as a Link Between Money and Prices in
Germany. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 130: 273- 289.